On September 21, 2022, Vladimir Putin escalated his war in Ukraine by declaring a partial military mobilization (i.e., limited conscription). The “partial” element of the declaration was somewhat of a misnomer – anyone may receive summons to the front lines. Although the Russian government stated that all the 300,000 drafted Russians would have previous military experience, this does not appear to have occurred. Reports abound of unprepared Russians receiving draft notices, including the old and infirm. Even a man in a wheelchair received a draft notice. The draft has been so poorly handled that Putin himself, who almost never acknowledges problems in his government, admitted that mistakes were made.
Facing the prospect of lining up against a motivated and successful Ukrainian army, hundreds of thousands of Russians are heading for the exits. Flights out of Russia immediately sold out. Lines to cross the border into Georgia and Kazakhstan, which offer visa-free entry to Russians, stretched for dozens of kilometers. At least 200,000 Russians fled the country following the announcement of the draft.
These events present Western countries with a choice: should we let Russians in or not? European governments have expressed different views, partially rooted in their perception of the potential risks and rewards of an open-door policy, as well as historical experiences vis-à-vis Russia. Germany seems keen to accept Russians fleeing the draft. Its Justice Minister tweeted that any Russian who “hates Putin’s way and loves liberal democracy” is welcome. France seems broadly aligned with Germany, although the government has been less forthcoming about its policy intentions.
There are good, rational reasons for this approach. Highly educated Russian draft dodgers could serve as strategic assets, bringing technical skills that Western countries could use. Moreover, showing openness and generosity to vulnerable Russians would undermine Putin’s narrative that the war in Ukraine is a conflict pitting Russia versus a decadent and malign West. In the long run, it may prove to be a savvy policy.
But not all Western governments are convinced. Eastern European governments are far more suspect of the newcomers. The government of Finland, Poland, and the three Baltic states – Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia – have declared that they will not give asylum to Russian draft dodgers. The Ukrainian government has also supported closing European borders to Russians of all stripes.
There are also rational reasons for this policy. A large influx of Russians could destabilize societies, as waves of refugees have done before. The establishment of a larger Russian-speaking population in nearby countries could serve as a casus belli for the next Russian invasion. Some politicians question if anti-West Russians will take advantage of an open-door policy to slip across borders and interfere with their host countries’ politics (an argument that is a bit of a stretch, to be honest). Another possibility is that closing the exits will force Russians to rise up, overthrow Putin, and end the war. “The only way to influence Putin,” Ukrainian President Zelensky said, is to “close the borders for a year and […] see the result.”
Although important, I’d like to set this debate aside for a moment. It is focused on a desired outcome – an end to the war – and the best route to achieving this goal is far from clear. It’s fundamentally a debate about strategy and tactics. Instead, I’d like to focus on a narrower set of considerations: moral views. Accepting Russian draft-dodgers is either right or wrong on its own merits, and a parade of articles have been written about the possible moral obligations Westerners have towards Russians fleeing mobilization. I will analyse this specific debate, track the moral views that are expressed, and conclude with some policy recommendations.
Three Ways of Thinking about Refugees
Let’s start with a little philosophizing: how can different groups of refugees differ from one another? One major distinction is the reason why refugees flee their homes. There are at least three archetypes of refugees based on this criterion, presented here in order of descending moral merit:
- Refugees of Conflict: This is the standard image of a refugee. War has come to their country by no fault of their own. They were left with a choice: stay and die, or leave and perhaps survive. Anyone would take the second option, so this archetype of refugees is highly worthy of sympathy and support. There are millions of these people around the world, from Syrians to Rohingya to Ukrainians.
- Refugees of Conscience: Think of a government-in-exile or a conscientious objector. They are not necessarily fleeing the threat of armed conflict. Rather, refugees of conscience made a dignified choice to leave their homes, often in opposition to the government in power. One highly prominent refugee of conscience is Cai Xia, a former professor at the Central Party School of China who fell out with Xi Jinping and now lives in the United States. Generally, refugees of conscience are worthy of sympathy, but it’s possible to argue that they should stay and fight against their governments directly, in contrast to refugees of conflict. For example, after he was poisoned and fled to Germany to recover, the Russian dissident Alexi Navalny could have become a refugee of conscience, but he decided to return and become a political prisoner. This is often viewed as a more moral decision than remaining in a safe foreign country.
- Refugees of Convenience: To most people, these aren’t “real” refugees. They’re either responsible for their situation (like a criminal on the run) or not at significant risk in the first place (such as economic migrants posing as asylum seekers). Such refugees seek better conditions for themselves but are not escaping the threat of physical violence or armed conflict in their home country. Refugees of convenience are often viewed as cowardly and/or dishonest, shirking their responsibilities and playing the system. Consequently, people generally feel lower moral obligations to them.
There are many public debates over how to classify waves of migrants, especially in politically tense moments. This dynamic was highly visible in the 2015 Refugee Crisis in the European Union. People who favoured an open-door policy tended to frame the newcomers as ‘refugees of conflict’, fleeing war and strife. At the same time, a narrative of ‘refugees of convenience’ was also prevalent: the “refugees” were just seeking access to the generous social benefits of European countries and doing so by semi-legal means. The European Union muddled through the 2015 Refugee Crisis without one narrative becoming dominant, which contributed to its inconsistent and occasionally schizophrenic policymaking in this period.
However, Ukrainians who arrived in early 2022 were overwhelmingly viewed as ‘refugees as conflict’, which helps explain why European countries threw open their doors. The outpouring of support was surprising to many observers who remembered the 2015 Refugee Crisis. But it makes sense. There was no serious debate over how to classify Ukrainian refugees, so the moral implications were clear.
Unfortunately for Russian draft dodgers, no one seriously believes that they are ‘refugees of conflict,’ so they are unlikely to receive a similar welcome. Their country is the aggressor in a war, not the victim. Even so, on the one hand, it’s possible that the recent wave of Russians could be viewed as refugees of conscience. If so, then Western countries are still likely to be generous with their asylum policies. On the other hand, it is also possible that Russian draft dodgers will simply be regarded as ‘refugees of convenience,’ causing Western countries to shut their borders. Let’s see what people are saying and try to determine which narrative is more widely held.
Russian Draft Dodgers are Refugees of Convenience
Let’s address the options in reverse moral order. Many people ascribe low motivations to Russian draft dodgers: they’re just trying to save their own skin. Since polling suggests that large majorities of the Russian population are seemingly in favour of the “special military operation”, fleeing Russia after the mobilization was announced is evidence of cowardice. The Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs made this point in an English-language tweet:
Many of Russians who now flee Russia because of mobilisation were fine with killing Ukrainians, they did not protest then, it is not right to consider them as conscious objectors.
To these commentators, the timing of the flight, right after regular Russians were at risk of conscription, is too convenient. These Russians were, at best, apathetic to the war crimes being committed by their country, and at worst, enthusiastic the Russian army’s conduct. That’s hardly a laudable position, so Western countries would have no moral obligation to help these people.
Interviews with Russians who recently arrived in neighboring countries provide evidence confirming this view. The worst PR comes from Russians who flee and are openly in favour of the war. The New York Times cited the case of Dmitri, a tech worker who is now located in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Leaving behind his wife and daughter, he relocated to Kyrgyzstan because he was afraid of being drafted. But the man is in favour of the war and wants to “denazify” Ukraine. In fact, he appears to be even more fanatical than Putin; he opposed the freeing of the leaders of the Azov Regiment, which Russian propaganda paints as a neo-Nazi group, in a prisoner swap. In other words, he strongly supports the goals of the war but doesn’t want to get personally involved, so he ran away. If the term “refugee of convenience” ever makes it into the dictionary, maybe Dmitri’s face will be right beside the definition.
And, unsurprisingly, the moral outrage was evident in the comment section:
Most Russians didn’t give their nation’s aggression in Ukraine much thought, until it touched them personally…because it inconvenienced them…not out of ethics. – LDH, Prague (1,086 likes)
No where is this tragically comic with the young man named Dimitri here. He believes all sorts of lies but wouldn’t do a thing to defend what he believes in. He will accept the crazy idea that there are ‘nazis’ in Ukraine but that Putin isn’t getting them. – Paul, New York (427 likes)
This reveals that Russia’s near-total moral erosion exists not just at the top but at every level. That these men cared nothing about what their country was doing to innocent Ukrainians but now flee because their own lives are threatened—this reveals they have no moral principles. They are utterly selfish. – Ruth, Minnesota (415 likes)
The popularity of these comments demonstrate that significant portions of Western populations believe that Russian draft dodgers are refugees of convenience, if “refugee” is the right term at all. Consequently, these Westerners are unlikely to support accepting many of them.
Russian Draft Dodgers are Refugees of Conscience
Not all agree. There is no shortage of voices that are sympathetic to the plight of Russian draft dodgers. Some focus on the coercive nature of conscription itself. “Forcing people to stay and accept the draft”, the Economist argues, “so that they get sent to the front to kill and die is cruel.” No one, it follows, should be mandated to kill others. There is a long history of granting asylum to conscientious objectors – those who refuse to fight due to their beliefs – although the exact contours of the definition remain legally unclear (Dmitri could even fit the bill). Surveying the public discourse though, this is a niche, academic moral stance, and it doesn’t appear to be widely shared across social media.
Other views are more widespread. Some bring attention to the anti-war and anti-government sentiments within the population that is fleeing. For example, this Kyrgyz commentator notes the following on a Reddit comment (1,200 net likes):
Its insane the amount of Russians here. The one thing I have noticed amongst them all is they are good people, who love their culture, love their country, but don’t like the government.
If this view is accurate, then Russian refugees should be welcomed. They’re part of the resistance. Although this position is credible and honestly held by many commentators, it’s hard to square this view with the high support the war enjoys in Russia. There are many widely shared images on social media of local protestors/hecklers challenging fleeing Russians. “In surveys, most of you support the war. So why now are you leaving?” read one sign on the Georgian side of the border. The schadenfreude was palpable. Only a minority of commentators seem to believe that most Russian draft dodgers are actually anti-war.
Perhaps the most interesting argument is rooted in Russian history. An essay in The Atlantic argued that Russians naturally acquiesce to strong-man governments as a “survival strategy.” The Russian state – from the Khans, to the Tsars, to the General Secretaries – have taken a dim view of dissent. Crackdowns are immediate, and with the tools available to the state, protests are almost never successful. Staying silent and keeping your head down is the only way for Russians to survive.
This view was echoed by a popular comment (1,200 net likes) by a Latvian on Reddit. After describing how their grandparents almost starved to death in Siberia, the commentator outlined the lessons that Russians learn:
You quickly understood, that the government doesn’t give a flying fuck, if it decides, it decides, if an infant is going to be killed for nothing, then infant will die. Logic or humanity doesnt matter, orders are orders, and you better shut it if you dont want to be just another number in the statistic.
If true, the moral implications of this view are obvious. It would be ignorant and unreasonable to expect Russians to just rise up and overthrow their government without considering the social context in which they were raised. It’s asking Russians to just pull themselves up by the bootstraps and magically fix all their problems, an argument widely considered risible when applied to poverty and other social ills.
This view also puts the reaction to mobilization in a new light. Fleeing the country is not an act of convenience, but the last (or maybe only) available option for an oppressed people. It may be seductive to expect these people to take to the streets, but that view betrays a naïve understanding of how oppression and dictatorship actually work. As a result, Western countries should be willing to accept Russian draft dodgers. They may not be ideal, but they are products of their environment.
Conclusion
This review of the public discourse over Russian draft dodgers exposes a complex moral landscape. Frankly, there is no consensus in English-language discourse about the moral way of treating Russians seeking asylum. Western populations appear to be torn. There is a range of moral views, and the debate is lively. Consequently, it is not clear how the public would react to a loosening or tightening of travel restrictions for Russians.
However, there are a few elements likely to shape moral views going forward. First, the view of Russians as ‘refugees of convenience’ is likely to become more and more prevalent. It’s already easily detectable in the discourse, and it is far more straightforward than the ‘refugees of conscience’ narrative, which relies on tortuous assumptions about the political views, psychological state, and historical memory of the Russian people. With moral arguments, simpler is always better.
Second, when Russians left the country is an extremely important factor. Those who left after mobilization are much more likely to be considered refugees of convenience, because their claims of holding anti-war sentiments are far less credible. Consequently, Western countries would elicit less of a backlash if they opened their borders only to Russians who fled prior to mobilization, especially if they could demonstrate prior anti-war actions or beliefs. This could serve as an effective basis for an expanded immigration policy that won’t elicit moral outrage.
Finally, Western populations are in no mood for strategic arguments. It might seem obvious to some policy wonks that Western countries should encourage brain drain from Russia by opening their borders, but people are motivated by other moral considerations. The war in Ukraine is viewed by many as an existential battle between good and evil, and there appears to be little appetite for policies that contradict or undermine this narrative, effective though such policies could turn out to be. If governments are interested in opening their doors to Russians, moral arguments, not just technocratic ones, need to be made.
More work needs to be done on this topic. If governments want to avoid implementing policy that will invite major backlash, they will need to continuously monitor the public discourse and act accordingly. If the ‘refugee of conscience’ narrative becomes more prominent, more open refugee policies become more politically viable. However, if most people believe that Russians are ‘refugees of convenience’, the political price for accepting them would be high.